Quantum computing is moving onto the agenda of financial regulators. On 5 November 2026, the UK's Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) announced the creation of a Quantum Experimentation Group, which will explore how quantum technologies could help financial institutions detect money laundering and fraud. The initiative, scheduled to launch in the first quarter of 2027, will bring together financial firms, technology providers and research laboratories to test potential applications of quantum machine learning.
Just one day later, on 6 November, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) published a consultation paper on quantum-safe migration, proposing a timetable for financial institutions to protect their systems against future quantum computing threats. Unlike the FCA, which is exploring the technology's potential benefits, MAS is preparing for its possible consequences.
Together, these developments suggest that the financial industry is entering a new technological era. Although quantum computing remains at an early stage, Finance Magnates Intelligence examines what the future could look like and how retail brokers, liquidity providers and financial technology firms can prepare.
London's trading industry is coming home!
Two Regulatory Approaches: Quantum Innovation and Cybersecurity Resilience
The FCA's initiative represents an experimental approach to quantum computing. Its Quantum Experimentation Group will initially investigate whether quantum machine learning can improve the detection of suspicious financial transactions, money laundering and fraud. Participants will work with synthetic datasets provided by the regulator, allowing them to test quantum methods against conventional computing techniques without exposing real customer information. The FCA is accepting expressions of interest until 31 December 2026.
For FX/CFD brokers, this could eventually translate into more sophisticated monitoring of client transactions, suspicious deposits and withdrawals, and relationships between accounts. Technology providers specialising in compliance automation and transaction monitoring could also benefit. However, the FCA has not established that quantum computing performs better than existing solutions. Its objective is precisely to determine whether such advantages exist.
- FCA Invites Firms to Test Whether Quantum Computers Can Spot Money Laundering
- After 900 IT Incidents, BaFin Expands Cybersecurity Oversight, Sets 2030 Encryption Target
- Singapore Puts $173 Million Behind Its Next Fintech Push
Singapore is approaching the technology from the opposite direction. MAS wants financial institutions to prepare for quantum computers powerful enough to break widely used encryption methods, including RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography. Its proposed guidance covers governance, cryptographic inventories, migration planning, third-party technology dependencies and system testing. Importantly, MAS proposes supervisory expectations rather than new legally binding obligations.
The implications extend beyond banks. Retail brokers depend on secure client authentication, trading platforms, payment infrastructure and connections with liquidity providers. Although technology vendors may not be directly subject to every supervisory requirement, regulated clients will increasingly need their cooperation to upgrade vulnerable systems.
| MAS proposed quantum-safe migration timetable | |
| Deadline | Proposed milestone |
| 30 June 2027 | Migration plans submitted by designated critical infrastructure operators |
| 31 December 2027 | Migration plans prepared by other financial institutions |
| 31 December 2029 | Critical information infrastructure systems migrated by designated operators |
| 31 December 2030 | Critical systems migrated by financial institutions |
| 31 December 2034 | Remaining systems migrated |
| Source: MAS, Consultation Paper P019-2026 | |
Preparing Financial Infrastructure: Quantum-Enabled Compliance
For retail brokers and technology providers, preparing for quantum computing does not necessarily mean investing in quantum hardware. The immediate priority is understanding which systems rely on potentially vulnerable cryptography. These can include client portals, trading platforms, payment gateways, API connections, customer databases and communication channels linking brokers with liquidity providers. Both MAS and FINMA recommend creating comprehensive inventories of cryptographic assets, identifying critical systems and developing migration plans.
You can read the full analysis with all business insights on Finance Magnates Intelligence.